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ABSTRACT
Local democracy has increasingly faced problems such as declining voter turn-
out and decreasing trust in political parties. Certain forms of participatory
democracy have been introduced to address political disengagement. Often
these eﬀorts do not deliver the envisaged results, as they exacerbate existing
inequalities by attracting only certain groups of citizens. This paper takes a close
look at representation to ﬁnd out if and how it can strengthen local democracy.
Non-electoral representation, as manifested by representative claims based on
non-electoral grounds, such as identity and expertise, made by local councillors,
as well as non-elected individuals and organisations, might serve to mitigate
democratic problems. We empirically study manifestations of electoral and non-
electoral representation and their interactions. We conclude that non-electoral
representation can strengthen local democracy, but its relationship with elec-
toral representation can also be problematic. We make suggestions as to how
these problems might be overcome in an eﬀort to strengthen the local repre-
sentative system.
KEYWORDS Local democracy; representation; representative claims; decentralisation; qualitative
research
Introduction
Strengthening local democracy has been on the agenda in many countries
in recent decades (Forde 2005, Geurtz and van de Wijdeven 2010; Michels
and de Graaf 2010; Ladner and Fiechter 2012). Nevertheless, local democ-
racy increasingly faces problems. In a variety of Western European countries,
including the Netherlands, election turnout is steadily declining and political
parties struggle to provide a connection between society and politics (www.
kiesraad.nl). This is reﬂected by decreasing trust in parties and diﬃculties
associated with recruiting (local) elected representatives (Mair 2005;
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Hendriks 2009; Saward 2010; Copus 2012; Voerman and Boogers 2014;
Grimberg and Vollaard 2016).
Forms of direct, participatory and deliberative democracy have been intro-
duced at the local level in an attempt to address this political disengagement
and the inequality it entails (Meadowcroft 2001; Forde 2005; Geurtz and van
de Wijdeven 2010; Michels and de Graaf 2010; Ladner and Fiechter 2012;
Michels 2012). However, these eﬀorts often do not deliver the envisaged
results (Meadowcroft 2001; Ladner and Fiechter 2012). A key problem is
that these tactics often attract the same groups of citizens that participate
in elections, thereby exacerbating existing inequalities and creating the dan-
ger that the distrust felt by those without a voice will increase further (Michels
and de Graaf 2010; Bovens and Wille 2011; Michels and Binnema 2016).
In this paper, we look more closely at representation to explore other
ways of strengthening local democracy. While scholarly attention has often
focused on electoral representation alone, it has long been recognised that
political representation involves a variety of activities by many people and
groups (Pitkin 1967). Recent contributions to representation theory take this
into consideration by emphasising the many manifestations of representa-
tion (Rehfeld 2006; Urbinati 2006; Lord and Pollak 2010; Saward 2010; Severs
2010; Taylor 2010; Disch 2011; Maia 2012; Montanaro 2012; Chapman and
Lowndes 2014; van de Bovenkamp and Vollaard 2018). They do so by
focusing on all actors making representative claims, including those claims
made on a basis other than having been elected (Saward 2010). These actors
can be elected representatives such as local councillors, but also non-
elected organisations and individuals, including, for example, environmental
organisations that claim to represent future generations or doctors who
claim to represent patients.
By taking non-electoral representation into account as well, we are able
to assess the democratic quality of the representative system as a whole
(Urbinati and Warren 2008; Lord and Pollak 2010; Taylor 2010; Disch 2011;
Mansbridge 2011; Maia 2012). This also requires analysis of the way electoral
and non-electoral representation interact and how they complement and/or
conﬂict with each other (Lord and Pollak 2010). We are still in need of
empirical studies that explore how non-electoral representation might
strengthen local democracy and how it interacts with electoral representa-
tion in practice (Hendriks 2009; Taylor 2010; De Wilde 2013; Dufek and
Holzer 2013; Saward 2016). This paper, therefore, seeks to answer the
following research question: how does non-electoral representation relate to
electoral representation at the local level?
In what follows, we ﬁrst discuss recent contributions to theory on non-
electoral representation and how it relates to electoral representation.
Second, we present the methods we use to study democratic representation
empirically. Third, we present our empirical ﬁndings on representation at the
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local level in the Netherlands. Finally, we discuss the implications of our results
in terms of studying local representation and improving local democracy.
Electoral and non-electoral representative claims
Democratic representation relates to the creative activity of ‘making present
again’ citizens’ preferences, identities and/or desires in public decision-
making (Pitkin 1967). Traditionally, elections and political parties have
been key topics in discussions and studies of representative democracy at
the local level. The responsiveness of elected representatives to their con-
stituents is considered to be the determinant of the democratic quality of
representation and includes the criteria of authorisation (selection or direc-
tion of representatives) and accountability (a representative’s sense of obli-
gation to explain and justify their conduct to those they represent) (Pitkin
1967; Bovens 2007; Urbinati and Warren 2008). According to the traditional
view, citizens authorise and hold parties and local councillors accountable
for actions taken on their behalf by means of elections. However, the
viability of this aspect of representative democracy has been called into
question, as electoral authorisation and accountability have begun to face
increasing problems. These problems include parties losing their roots in
society, the nationalisation of local elections, declining voter turnout and a
growing reluctance on the part of citizens to become politicians (Mair 2005;
Hendriks 2009; Saward 2010; Kroger 2013; Grimberg and Vollaard 2016). In
the meantime, non-elected actors are emerging increasingly often as poten-
tial representatives in local governance networks (Sweeting and Copus
2012), thus challenging traditional electoral democracy.
Instead of juxtaposing traditional and network forms of democracy, we
adopt an inclusive view of representation in our study by using the concept
of representative claim, which includes representation manifested in elec-
toral and non-electoral claims (Saward 2010; Rehfeld 2006). The concept of
representative claims allows us to explore representation beyond the elec-
toral mandate by focusing on all actors, including unelected ones, that claim
to represent certain groups or causes in the public sphere. For instance,
churches can claim to represent followers based on religion, doctors can
make claims for patients based on their medical expertise and patients can
do so on the basis of shared experiences (Saward 2009, 2010). Furthermore,
taking a representative claim approach allows for deeper analysis of claims
made by elected councillors. Councillors may base their representative
claims on their elected position, but they are also able to make claims on
behalf of groups and causes on non-electoral bases, including expertise,
shared experience or common identity.
To ensure responsiveness, non-elected representation depends on alter-
native means of authorisation (to select and direct representatives) and
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accountability (to create an obligation on the part of representatives to be
accountable to those they represent). These alternative means include peti-
tions, contributions to public deliberations, organised protest, membership
to an organisation, accounting for one’s actions in public debates, meeting
with members and making plans and reports publicly available. These
authorisation and accountability mechanisms can serve to ensure the demo-
cratic quality of their representation eﬀorts (Urbinati and Warren 2008;
Montanaro 2012; van de Bovenkamp and Vollaard 2018).
As said, studies of non-electoral representation are needed to understand its
eﬀect on local democracy. There is, of course, an abundance of literature that
focuses on civil society organisations (CSOs), network governance, corporatism
and pluralism. This literature tends to zero in on how CSOs and private
organisations contribute to the eﬀectiveness of policy-making or deal with
the inﬂuence of their lobbying activities on policy. However, these studies
remain limited in terms of their analysis of the role of these issues in relation
to democracy (Sorensen and Torﬁng 2007). When these studies do take this
into account, they often analyse them as instances of participation or delibera-
tion rather than representation (Dryzek 2007; Kroger and Friedrich 2013; Wolﬀ
2013). As such, there is little scholarly reﬂection on how these actors contribute
to representative democracy (for exceptions see for example Sorensen 2002;
Esmark 2007; Kohler-Koch 2010) and how they relate to electoral representa-
tives. In addition, these studies do not take into account that elected repre-
sentatives can also practice non-electoral representation by relying on
foundations and mechanisms of authorisation and accountability other than
elections to justify their representative claims. Moreover, these studies have a
tendency to neglect individuals who appoint themselves or are appointed by
others as representatives. They also often disregard the fact that representation
is not a given, but rather a construction in a creative process initiated by a
representative claim. In making a representative claim, a new group of repre-
sented individuals can be created. In addition, at the outset, an actor might be
unwilling to be or unaware of being a representative, but is perceived as one
nonetheless as he or she makes claims on behalf of others. Therefore, recent
theorising on representative claims and empirical studies inspired by the con-
cept are a useful addition to the current literature on CSOs and network
governance. The concept of representative claims allows us to assess the
democratic quality of the representative system as a whole.
Exploring the local representative system
To determine the democratic quality of local representation, it is not suﬃcient
to simply look at the relationship between representatives and those they claim
to represent. Studying the local representative system as a whole is important
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here, which requires an exploration of how electoral and non-electoral repre-
sentation relate to each other. Several ideas exist about this relationship.
First, adding non-electoral representation to the representativemix is said to
inﬂuence equality in a number of ways. Some authors point out that non-
electoral representation is a danger to equality because it often lacks clear
authorisation and accountability structure based on equality of voice, as exists
in elections. Moreover, it is argued that non-electoral representation can
exacerbate inequalities as, in the context of seeking to inﬂuence policy, some
actors enjoy more resources, capabilities and access to decision-makers than
others (Urbinati and Warren 2008; Lord and Pollak 2010). However, the reverse
argument is also made that non-electoral representation can make an impor-
tant contribution to equality in the representative system. Asmentioned above,
non-electoral representation may rely on alternative authorisation and
accountability mechanisms. Also, the principle of one person, one vote fails
to encompass the patterns of disadvantage apparent across certain groups.
People may remain silent because they lack the capacity to raise their voice or
have lost trust in electoral authorisation and accountability. Non-electoral
claims might, therefore, be accepted because they are considered more
authentic than electoral ones (Saward 2009). Also, uneven voter turnout is a
problem because it brings with it the danger that elected representatives are
not equally responsive to the needs and preferences of all citizens. If certain
groups of citizens are invisible, a representative will not be inclined to respond
to them (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba 1996; Bovens andWille 2011). This is where
non-electoral representation has potential; opening up representation beyond
elected representation can help make the invisible visible (Taylor 2010; Kroger
and Friedrich 2013; Saward 2016), as groups that are not inclined to raise their
voice themselves can be represented by means of non-electoral representation
(Urbinati and Warren 2008; Montanaro 2012). Moreover, through non-electoral
representation, representative claims can be made for speciﬁc groups that are
disproportionately aﬀected by certain policies (Urbinati and Warren 2008; Lord
and Pollak 2010). Here, the distribution of inﬂuence over decisions according to
the principle of one person, one vote seems rather unfair (Saward 2009, 2016;
Lord and Pollak 2010).
Second, non-electoral representation can provide information about citi-
zens’ views on particular issues, thereby contributing to authorisation within
the representative system. It can do justice to the varied preferences of
citizens and emphasise issues that citizens feel most strongly about, which
cannot be fully expressed through a single vote (Saward 2009, 2016; Lord
and Pollak 2010;). Moreover, non-electoral representation can connect
society and politics, between elections in particular, when (new) salient
issues are at stake (Saward 2010; van de Bovenkamp and Vollaard 2015).
In this view, non-elected representatives can be seen as an information
channel, in addition to elections.
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Third, elected representatives can complement non-electoral representa-
tives focusing on the interest of speciﬁc groups by weighing diﬀerent
interests in the public debate, thereby ensuring accountability with a view
to serving the common interest of the community (Wolﬀ 2013). Also in this
sense, the two avenues of representation can be considered complemen-
tary. Together, elected and non-elected representatives can create checks
and balances in the representative system (Lord and Pollak 2010; Maia 2012).
However, Lord and Pollak (2010) warn against assuming too quickly that
combinations of electoral and non-electoral representation will necessarily
add up to good representation. The two can also undermine each other.
Studies of direct participation of citizens reveal the tensions between direct
forms of democracy and electoral representation (Meadowcroft 2001; Forde
2005; Geurtz and van de Wijdeven 2010; Ladner and Fiechter 2012). Similar
tensions can be envisaged between electoral and non-electoral representa-
tion. For instance, an increasing number of representative claims means that
claims can collide, creating deadlock when claim-makers refuse to give way
to other claims. Alternatively, a large number of claims can lead to duplica-
tion and ineﬃciency (Lord and Pollak 2010).
As the points made above illustrate, it is important to focus on the inter-
relationship and interactions between non-electoral and electoral represen-
tation to explore the contribution of non-electoral representation in terms of
strengthening local democracy. Figure 1 summarises the theoretical debate
discussed here. Empirical studies on this issue are important, but they are
few in number (Taylor 2010; Kroger and Friedrich 2013; Saward 2016). In the
next sections, we will develop our empirical case in an eﬀort to ﬁll this void.
Methods
We studied local policy-making in the area of recently decentralised health
and social policies in the Netherlands. On 1 January 2015, the amended Social
Support Act (Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning), the Youth Act (Jeugdwet)
and the Participation Act (Participatiewet) transferred tasks such as the labour
reintegration of people with a handicap, youth mental health care and care
for the elderly and people with a handicap from the national to the local level.
These decentralised policies constitute an excellent case for exploring a local
representative system in its entirety. The ﬁrst reason for this is that the Dutch
have, themselves, identiﬁed the problem of low trust in politics and political
parties (Den Ridder and Dekker 2015). Moreover, it has been noted that many
council members lack knowledge about the decentralisation eﬀort and its
impact on vulnerable groups in society, which is said to limit their ability to
act as representatives (Loots and Peeters 2013; Raad voor het Openbaar
Bestuur 2013; Van Den Berg 2013). Second, as was the case here, decentra-
lisation is often seen as being a catalyst for the revitalisation of local
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democracy (Canel 2001; Peters, van Stipdonk and Castenmiller 2014). Third,
people confronted with the consequences of the decentralised policies raise
their own voice less often than others. For example, less-educated people
turn up less often to vote at elections (Bovens and Wille 2011), which is
challenging because their labour issues and health problems are diﬀerent
from those of more highly educated people (Denktas and Burdof 2016).
Finally, the Netherlands traditionally sees a variety of both non-elected and
elected representatives, also at the local level.
The Netherlands holds elections for 380 (as of 2018) local councils every
four years. These councils appoint the aldermen in the executive board, who
cannot be members of the local council. While the mayor is formally
appointed by the government for a period of six years, the preference of
the local council is usually decisive. The mayor chairs both the local council
and the executive board. The local council is responsible both for legislation,
usually in keeping with the proposals of the executive board, and for the
control of the executive board. The executive board is responsible for
Complement  Conflict  
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representatives can enrich 
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Non-electoral 
representatives can make 
more specific claims 
focusing on groups who are 
specifically affected by 
certain policies 
Non-electoral 
representatives often lack a 
clear authorization and 
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causing 
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Figure 1. Arguments from the literature on how non-electoral representation can
complement and conﬂict with electoral representation.
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preparation of legislation and implementation, including the many tasks to
be carried out on behalf of the national state, from which they receive most
of their budget.
For exploratory purposes of our study, we sought to carry out in-depth
case studies as they allow us to determine what kind of non-electoral
representation takes place and how it relates to electoral representation.
In an eﬀort to ﬁnd as much variety as possible in terms of non-electoral
representation, we selected two municipalities that diﬀer in terms of their
population’s health and socio-economic issues, their socio-geographic
nature and level of education. We conducted qualitative case studies of
a mid-sized, economically vibrant, university city (Municipality A) in the
heavily populated conurbation in the west of the country and one small
amalgamated municipality in the rural, economically declining north
(Municipality B). We conducted the study in the period between January
2014 and June 2015, when major decisions on the decentralised social
and health policies needed to be made. The two cases diﬀered in terms of
the level of education of constituents, which is a strong indicator of
political participation (higher in Municipality A) and the percentage of
people that rely on services provided under the decentralised acts
(greater in Municipality B). This allowed us to explore non-electoral repre-
sentation in diﬀerent settings.
We used a multi-method design consisting of: (a) a survey of existing
literature; (b) document analysis and (c) qualitative interviews. The literature
studied dealt with representation in the Netherlands and decentralisation.
We used this literature to place our case studies in a broader context. The
document analysis included analysis of the proposals made by the national
government and the local executive boards regarding decentralisation. To
learn about the kind of representatives involved in the policy-making pro-
cess, we examined contributions in formal decision-making processes (e.g.
reports on consultation rounds and council meeting minutes); local news-
paper reports on the decentralisation and documents and websites of non-
electoral representatives. These documents were also used to identify repre-
sentatives. The results of the document analysis were subsequently used in
the selection of respondents for our interviews and the topics discussed
with them. We interviewed: (a) elected representatives (n = 7); (b) non-
elected representatives (n = 21), such as members of patient organisations,
advisory council members, (health care) professionals and a local journalist
and (c) aldermen (n = 3) and civil servants or consultants in the employ of
the municipality (n = 3). Interviews focused on who claimed to represent
whom and based on what, as well as ideas about other representatives and
the relationship between electoral and non-electoral representation.
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Results
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the various actors that act or identify as
possible representatives in the debate on decentralisation. Next, we discuss
how electoral and non-electoral representation complement each other and
how they may serve to undermine one another.
Electoral and non-electoral claims
Our study reveals that a variety of actors make representative claims at the
local level.
Electoral representation
First, representatives at the local level are the elected local councillors who
are usually organised in political parties. Their claims are often not very
explicitly made. Sometimes, parties claim to speak on behalf of ‘the people’
or citizens in general, but also more speciﬁcally on behalf of certain groups
aﬀected by the decentralisation, including people that receive social bene-
ﬁts. Elected representatives derive their claims in part from their electoral
mandate. However, they also rely on informal contact with citizens to
educate themselves on the (eﬀects of) decentralisation. For instance, they
open up contact points for citizens, go on site visits, interact with non-
elected representatives (more on this below) and/or draw on their own
experiences as professionals or service users (see also van de Bovenkamp
and Vollaard 2018). The extent to which elected representatives put eﬀort
into these contacts diﬀers, however.
Non-electoral representation
Many non-elected representatives are active in the debate on the decen-
tralisation. We looked at a broad set of actors making claims, including those
who did not describe themselves as representatives when they asked for
special attention to be paid to certain groups. This analysis drew on a wide
variety of representatives.
First, non-elected representatives were active at the national level, where
the decentralisation plans were intensely debated. Health care professionals,
patient organisations and health insurers were among the actors actively
claiming to represent clients and patients (van de Bovenkamp and Vollaard
2015). They wrote letters to the government and parliament and partici-
pated in the public debate on the decentralisation, expressing their concern
about the implications for vulnerable and dependent groups of citizens. For
example, a number of psychiatrists petitioned against the decentralisation
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of youth care, calling on people to sign: ‘We need your help to ensure good
care for children’ (www.petitiejeugdggz.nl).
At the local level, many actors that claimed to represent service users
were active as well. In addition, other actors identiﬁed possible representa-
tives for the future. The identiﬁed non-electoral representatives include
patient organisations, associations of the elderly, informal carer organisa-
tions (health care) professionals, neighbourhood organisations, local advi-
sory councils (which are oﬃcially assigned the role of advisor to the local
executive board), churches and schools. This variety of representatives were
observed in both municipalities; those who were active in the local public
debates on the decentralisation on behalf of some sort of constituency,
provided input during consultation rounds and in the context of formal and
informal contact with the responsible aldermen and local councillors. Their
claims were often more speciﬁc as compared to the ones made by elected
representatives; whereas local councillors referred to the general public,
non-elected representatives focused on, among others, people receiving
social beneﬁts, patients with chronic disease, the elderly and youngsters
suﬀering from psychiatric problems or addiction. The bases of the claims of
non-electoral representatives identiﬁed varied from their institutional posi-
tion (in the case of appointed advisory councils) and their own experience as
health and welfare service users, to day-to-day contact with service users
(whether as fellow patients, neighbours or clients), site visits or meetings
with members. Through direct contact, member meetings and media con-
tributions, they sought to authorise their representative claims. They also
accounted for their representative activities in a number of ways, including
writing minutes of their meetings and reports on their activities, making the
recommendations sent to the municipality publicly available on their web-
sites and sending newsletters to their members.
Non-electoral and electoral representation as complementary
avenues of representation
We identiﬁed a number of ways in which electoral and non-electoral repre-
sentation can complement each other.
Equality
Equality in electoral representation is often translated into practice in terms
of the principle of one person, one vote. However, as demonstrated above,
certain problems arise in relation to electoral representation in practice.
These problems also came to the fore in our study. People who did not
show up to the ballot box, tended to be the ones that were speciﬁcally
aﬀected by the decentralised social and health policies. This is problematic,
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as their needs and preferences concerning labour and health diﬀer some-
what from more highly educated constituents who more readily take part in
the electoral process (Denktas and Burdof 2016). Yet the preferences and
needs of these groups can be incorporated into electoral representation
when elected representatives also act on behalf of non-voters between
elections and maintain close contact with them. Local councillors do so to
varying degrees. Some try harder to voice the concerns of citizens who
remain silent in elections and participatory arrangements:
That’s why, in addition to seeking contact with neighbourhood organisations,
we also knock on the doors of people who don’t show up anywhere. These
people won’t go to meetings [of the neighbourhood organisation] and if you
go to these town meetings you just hear the people who do most of the
talking. As a political party, should you follow just them? (…) You need good
representation for the whole village, you know. (Municipal council member)
However, even for the elected representatives who put in quite a bit of
eﬀort to seek contact with citizens, certain groups remained out of reach:
People with a migrant background and mental health problems – you won’t
get anyone from those groups to talk about [their problems]. (…) So, if I try to
learn things through the usual channels I don’t get anywhere. (Municipal
council member)
Here, non-electoral representatives can complement electoral representa-
tives because they can provide a voice for certain groups that might other-
wise remain out of sight by maintaining closer contact with them than local
councillors. Some non-electoral representatives, such as certain patient
organisations and advisory councils, pay speciﬁc attention to vulnerable
groups, including those with lower levels of literacy, homeless people and
certain groups of non-western migrants and their descendants. However,
even these representatives faced diﬃculties in maintaining contact with
speciﬁc groups.
Respondents noted that actors, such as health professionals and
churches, only take up a representative role at the local level to a limited
extent. However, they are well-positioned to be the ones to ensure further
equality because of their daily contact with service users; ‘they go to some-
one’s home and see the misery’ (respondent patient organisation). Indeed,
they come into contact with all kinds of people.
It [the church] is one of the few organisations that gets into all kinds of
peoples’ homes (…) I mean in most cases a church has properly arranged
home visits. They go to peoples’ homes and see what happens there, talk to
people. So, it’s one of the organisations [that is capable of spotting problems]
ﬁrst. (Chairman, local advisory council for the Social Support Act)
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Non-electoral representatives can also bring to the fore the wishes of certain
groups who are diﬃcult to reach by acting as an intermediary between the
municipality and service users. For example, an alderman talked about the
diﬃculties he encountered when trying to talk to young people who use
certain services: ‘I want to talk to that one with that baseball cap (…) what
does he want? I can’t get to him: [he] thinks: “whatever”.’ A regional patient
organisation is trying to reach these youth by using methods familiar to
them, such as making short videos on cell phones about what they ﬁnd
important. Moreover, non-electoral representatives are well-positioned to
act as representatives of people with little trust in politics. Non-electoral
representatives can, therefore, be considered legitimate or, as Saward puts
it, ‘authentic’, because they operate outside the electoral arena. Yet even
patient organisations can face problems in this respect:
It is already a constant struggle, more or less intense, to explain to citizens that
we are an independent organisation, in principle. Because actually a lot of
people don’t trust anything anymore. (…) A lot of people don’t trust the
government. (Employee, patient organisation)
Although non-electoral representatives can contribute to ensuring equality
by bringing certain under-represented groups into view, respondents note
that some groups receive more attention than others. In general, it seems
that more representatives are active in the ﬁeld of care and social policies
and fewer are concerned with issues of work and income:
We contributed to input on the Participation Act (…). We were one of the few
who wrote recommendations for it. It struck me that no one else responded.
(Representative, patient organisation)
We can conclude that an important beneﬁt of having a wide variety of
representatives is that more groups are represented in decision-making.
Non-electoral representatives can put extra emphasis on the interests of
speciﬁc groups aﬀected by the decentralisation who were at risk of remain-
ing out of sight. However, there remain certain groups that still seem to be
under-represented in practice.
Information about citizens’ views
Our study has shown that non-electoral representation on the part of both
local councillors and non-electoral representatives can provide information
about the interests of certain groups of citizens. When non-electoral repre-
sentatives pass on this information to electoral representatives, the two
forms of representation can complement each other. Elections do not
provide direct information on the speciﬁc preferences of citizens regarding
the decentralisation, especially where voter turnout is low and parties are
12 H. M. V. D. BOVENKAMP AND H. VOLLAARD
less connected to society (Mair 2005; Wolﬀ 2013). In the case of the decen-
tralisation, an additional problem that emerged is the local council mem-
bers’ limited knowledge of the decentralised policies (Loots and Peeters
2013; Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur 2013; Van Den Berg 2013). Our
respondents also recognised this problem. The decentralisation process
took place very quickly. Moreover, a large number of newly elected council
members had to begin their council work when the decentralisation process
was already well underway. However, better connected and better informed
non-electoral representatives could help council members address their lack
of knowledge.
I called the previous chairman of the social support council on a weekly basis,
so to speak, so we had lots of informal contact. (…) We kept each other posted
on what was happening and who you should talk to. (Local council member)
At the same time, because of the formal competences of the local council,
these contacts also enabled non-electoral representatives to achieve their
objectives by inﬂuencing council members.
It has a bigger impact when the local council says it. It’s convenient for municipal
council members because, all of a sudden, they have more ammunition. I think
you can have more inﬂuence that way. (Employee, client organisation)
It is interesting to highlight here the key ﬁgures who emerge at the
municipal level. These actors often fulﬁlled various representative roles.
For instance, former council members were active as non-elected represen-
tatives, while some individuals acted as representatives in diﬀerent fora (e.g.
in a patient organisation and on an advisory council), at times for a variety of
groups. These well-connected individuals could ensure smooth communica-
tion between elected and non-elected representatives and between various
non-elected representatives.
Checks and balances
Non-electoral representatives in particular can cater to speciﬁc groups by
giving voice to their preferences. Although electoral representatives can and
do claim to represent speciﬁc groups, they also have a signiﬁcant role in the
system of representative democracy vis-à-vis the municipality as a whole, as
they must make decisions on policy proposals. Many council members also
regard the whole community as the most important object of representa-
tion (Karlsson 2013). Council members can, therefore, complement the
eﬀorts of non-electoral representatives, who focus on the interest of speciﬁc
groups, by balancing these interests with the shared interest of the com-
munity as a whole (Wolﬀ 2013; Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur 2016). In
this sense, the two avenues for representation can be considered
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complementary, in particular if council meetings serve as a forum in which
both electoral and non-electoral representatives explicate their various
claims, open to public scrutiny. This, however, is not always how things
happen in practice (see below).
Non-electoral and electoral representation as undermining
avenues of representation
So far, the results suggest that electoral and non-electoral representation co-
exist nicely and complement each other. However, representation proves to
be messy in practice; the two can also undermine each other.
Undermining claims
Our study shows that the way in which electoral and non-electoral repre-
sentation relate to each other can lead to conﬂicts that weaken the demo-
cratic nature of representation. An important cause of such problems is the
fact that non-electoral representatives often make their claim directly to the
local executive board or, more speciﬁcally, to the alderman in charge of a
certain policy, and not to the local council. Because of this focus, respon-
dents say that contact between these representatives and the local council
becomes somewhat problematic.
We are advisers of the executive board and are appointed by the executive
board. We make sure that the politicians know about [our advice]. (…) They
know our position. We need to know our place; we are not an advisory council
to the Council. (Chairman, Social Support Advisory Council)
This position means that there is little public discussion about the repre-
sentation eﬀorts of non-electoral representatives.
They [the advisory councils] are advisers to the executive board. And that
means that they do not advise the local council, but the executive board. So, if
there were a problem and they communicated that through the press, then
we would have a problem. Because you need to come to me with that. Then
you should say: hey, you’re doing something that I completely disagree with
and I’m going to tell the press […] That would be really unusual if that
happened. (Alderman)
As said, the focus of non-electoral representatives on the executive board
and the ensuing sensitivity around the contact between elected and non-
elected representatives can be an important reason for the diﬀerent claims
to undermine each other.
First, this issue limits the potential for non-electoral and electoral repre-
sentatives to share information that they could otherwise use for productive,
representation-related work. Second, non-electoral representation can
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undermine electoral representation, as it can be used strategically to silence
elected representatives. This is something that also happened in the context
of participatory policy-making with citizens (Mayer, Edelenbos et al. 2002).
Some non-elected representatives were granted a fair degree of inﬂuence
by the alderman. For example, the Social Support Act advisory councils are
often involved in policy development at an early stage; earlier, in fact, than
the local council.
I think they have even more inﬂuence than the local council. The local council
has to make the ﬁnal decision and does so based on the documents we
present from the executive board. But before those documents reach the
council, three advisory councils have seen them ﬁrst. (Alderman)
This can lead to questions about the role of electoral representatives in
these processes, as the proposals were already discussed with other actors
making representative claims. In Municipality B in particular, the municipal
council was informed about the proposed policies at such a late stage (and
much later than the advisory councils) that they were no longer able to
make any substantial changes.
Checks and balances
Contact between non-elected representatives and aldermen and civil ser-
vants is often informal. The same goes for existing contact between non-
electoral and electoral representatives. This impedes the functioning of
checks and balances in the system. Non-electoral representatives seldom
exercised their right to speak at council meetings in the cases we studied
and elsewhere. In turn, local councils seldom draw on their right to organise
public hearings on the subject of the decentralisation. Informal contact
keeps discussions on policy issues and, in this case, on the fundamental
issue of health and social policies, largely outside the public debate. This
limited the extent to which arguments concerning the decentralised policies
were publicly debated and the extent to which representatives could be
held accountable for the claims they made.
We observed that having key ﬁgures active in various representative
roles has the advantage of helping to encourage the exchange of infor-
mation between diﬀerent representative channels. But it also has a down-
side. As one of the aldermen noted, it can make representation vulnerable
and selective. It becomes vulnerable in that non-electoral representation
depends exclusively on a small group of individuals. As soon as one of
these individuals stops doing his or her representative work, holes
emerge in the representative system. This was an issue in the smaller
Municipality (B) in particular. The diﬃculties encountered by the advisory
councils and patients and elderly organisations in ﬁnding people that
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were willing to become active supports this view. Hearing the voices of
only certain individuals in multiple places also creates the danger of
encouraging selectivity:
You know he has a key position in [this city] […] and that means, no matter
how hard you try not to draw on your own opinion, the opinion of just one
person is still heard in a lot of things. (City council member)
In short, our case studies show that the combination of electoral and non-
electoral representation is not necessarily innocuous and can also cause
problems in practice in a number of ways. In the next section, we reﬂect
on these and other ﬁndings and explore ways in which the representative
system can be strengthened at the local level.
Discussion
In many countries, revitalising local democracy is a key issue on the political
agenda. In this paper, we aimed to explore how local democracy can be
strengthened through representation deﬁned more broadly than just elected
representation. In this section, we reﬂect on the lessons learned in our case
studies as they pertain to the study of local democracy and the identiﬁca-
tion of possible reinvigoration strategies.
The case studies showed that both electoral and non-electoral represen-
tation occurs at the local level and that their occurrence varies according to
the nature of municipalities and policy sectors and the strategies of the
representatives themselves. To explore this variation in depth, further
research is needed that examines a larger number of municipalities.
However, the two cases we studied oﬀer important insight with regard to
the discussion on how to reinvigorate local representative democracy.
We adopted a broad deﬁnition of representation that encompassed all
actors that made explicit representative claims, as well as those that did so
more implicitly by asking that attention be paid to speciﬁc groups. This
made it possible to bring into view the multiple activities of the many
people and groups involved in political representation (Pitkin 1967). Often,
non-electoral representatives are also involved in activities other than repre-
sentation. In our cases, for example, patient organisations also provided
peer support and information to their members, whereas the main activity
of professionals was providing care to their patients. Despite the fact that
representation is not their sole or even core activity it is important to take
their representative eﬀorts into account when studying representation to
determine how a representative system functions in its entirety.
Looking at the contribution of non-electoral representatives is important
in an eﬀort to move closer to the ideal of inclusion; equality requires
complex combinations of representation (Urbinati and Warren 2008). Non-
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elected representatives can speak for groups of citizens who are aﬀected by
a certain policy, but are often not inclined to speak up for themselves. This
was the situation with certain service users in our case studies. Thus, these
non-elected representatives can play an important role in making the invi-
sible visible (Verba 1996). Based on experiential knowledge, day-to-day
contact with service users, site visits and/or meetings with their members,
non-elected representatives are well-placed to identify the interests of these
speciﬁc groups. But, to contribute to democratic decision-making at the
local level, non-electoral representatives need to be responsive to their
created constituency. Our study shows that they have alternative authorisa-
tion and accountability mechanisms in place (for more on this, see van de
Bovenkamp and Vollaard 2018). Our case study, therefore, shows that the
importance of non-electoral representatives in terms of democratic decision-
making is not exclusively relevant in the area of global issues as is often
proposed (Saward 2010; Montanaro 2012; Kroger 2013). This form of repre-
sentation is also important within bounded territories, in our case the
municipalities, where electoral representation is available. Still, it should be
recognised that the combination of electoral and non-electoral representa-
tion will not necessarily solve all issues related to inequality. There will
always be certain groups that receive less attention than others (Saward
2016), as we saw in our case study. It is, therefore, argued that what is left
out of representation is as important as what is included (Schweber 2016).
While no doubt a challenge, future research should also examine the groups
that remain out of sight. In addition, it should also be acknowledged that,
despite their potential contribution to the vitality of local democracy, self-
appointed representative ‘key ﬁgures’ can produce rather fragile and selec-
tive channels of representation.
Electoral and non-electoral representation can be mutually reinforcing as
they encourage the sharing of information on citizens’ views and thus
ensure authorisation in the representative system. This was especially impor-
tant in our case study because many council members admitted to lacking
the necessary knowledge of the decentralised social and health policies.
Non-electoral representation can, therefore, be a crucial information channel
for elected representatives. In this way, electoral and non-electoral repre-
sentation can also help to ensure the proper functioning of checks and
balances in the representative system (Lord and Pollak 2010; Maia 2012).
According to the ‘sluice gate’ model, the information provided by non-
elected actors must be subject to the right democratic procedures to result
in legitimate decision-making (Habermas 1996; Lord and Pollak 2010). Seen
in this way, elected representatives have an additional role to play in
balancing the diﬀerent interests of citizens in an eﬀort to serve the common
interest of the entire community (Meadowcroft 2001).
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However, our case studies show that, in practice, the interactions
between electoral and non-electoral representation are complicated, which
can limit the sharing of information and may cause problems in terms of the
functioning of checks and balances in the system. Saward (2016) points out
that non-electoral representation can be messy, but the same applies to
electoral representation and to interaction between the two forms (van de
Bovenkamp and Vollaard 2018). This messiness means that electoral and
non-electoral representations are not necessarily complementary and can
also undermine each other (Lord and Pollak 2010). For example, the focus of
non-electoral representatives on executives limits the potential of electoral
and non-electoral representatives to share information (Wolﬀ 2013). Even
though this might be also common practice at other levels, it allows execu-
tives to strategically play various representatives oﬀ each other. The informal
nature of the contact between non-electoral representatives and the execu-
tive, and among various types of representatives themselves, means that
these interactions happen, in large part, outside of the public debate,
thereby limiting authorisation and accountability of the representatives
and the decision-making process.
We would like to conclude by identifying avenues for strengthening local
representation further. According to the sluice gate model (Habermas 1996),
making non-electoral representation and electoral representation part of the
public debate could be a way to strengthen the relationship. Representative
claims made by diﬀerent actors can be viewed critically, for instance profes-
sionals may sometimes have other interests at heart than those of their
patients. Patient organisations may claim to speak for all patients but may
actually represent the voices of particular groups of patients (Van de
Bovenkamp & Vollaard 2018). A public debate on the legitimacy of claims
has the advantage that claims need to be explicated, accepted and thereby
legitimated in public, which can strengthen the representative relationship.
Public debate on representative claims highlights the need for local
media reporting on local political issues. However, local media are dis-
appearing in many Dutch municipalities, which limits the transparency of
local politics (Stimuleringsfonds voor de Pers 2012). The decline in local
media makes creating alternative opportunities to ensure public debate
increasingly important. Non-electoral representatives can use their right
to speak at council meetings. And local councils can organise hearings
that include non-electoral representatives. Even in the debate, diﬀerent
claims will not always align and conﬂicts may still arise. This need not be
a problem, however, and can actually strengthen the representative sys-
tem. The debate among representatives can ensure reﬂexivity between
claim-makers and can encourage contestation (Disch 2011; Maia 2012;
Saward 2016). Competing claims force representatives to better justify
their claims and, depending on the outcome of the debate, claims can
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be accepted or rejected. Being explicit about the trade-oﬀs made in the
local council can also help to strengthen the accountability of the repre-
sentative system (Lord and Pollak 2010).
Local councils play an important role in local democracies (Copus 2013).
The concept of representative claims allows us to reconsider their represen-
tative practice. According to this view, elected representatives need to work
on explicating and giving meaning to their claims in order to remain
relevant. As stated earlier, it has been argued that electoral representatives
and the political parties they belong to have lost their roots in society, which
limits their potential to act as representatives (Mair 2005). In the past, these
representatives could count on a clearly demarcated constituency, workers
or Christians, for instance. This meant that representative claims could
remain fairly implicit (Saward 2008). Today, party ideology has become
less clear and local councillors can no longer count on a loyal constituency.
As a result, elected representatives are required to explicate more clearly
who they claim to represent and on what basis (Saward 2008). These claims
can then be subject to public debate to be scrutinised.
In sum, our analysis has shown that local representation is more vibrant
and varied than is often depicted. Both electoral and non-electoral repre-
sentation can and do play an important role in local democracy and could,
together, serve to strengthen it. In order to strengthen it further, it is import
to explicate claims and make them part of public discussions.
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